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Abstract
Recent advances show that deep neural networks
are not robust to deliberately crafted adversarial ex-
amples which many are generated by adding human
imperceptible perturbation to clear input. Consider
l2 norms attacks, Project Gradient Descent (PGD)
and the Carlini and Wagner (C&W) attacks are the
two main methods, where PGD control max per-
turbation for adversarial examples while C&W ap-
proach treats perturbation as a regularization term
optimized it with loss function together. If we care-
fully set parameters for any individual input, both
methods become similar. In general, PGD attacks
perform faster but obtains larger perturbation to
find adversarial examples than the C&W when fix-
ing the parameters for all inputs. In this report, we
propose an efficient modified PGD method for at-
tacking ensemble models by automatically chang-
ing ensemble weights and step size per iteration per
input. This method generates smaller perturbation
adversarial examples than PGD method while re-
mains efficient as compared to C&W method. Our
method won the first place in IJCAI19 Targeted Ad-
versarial Attack competition.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples, which are often generated by adding perturbations to the
clear input [Szegedy et al., 2013]. Understanding of how to
manipulate adversarial examples can improve model robust-
ness [Arnab et al., 2018] and help to develop better training
algorithms [Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2016;
Trame`r et al., 2017]. Recently, several methods [Szegedy
et al., 2013; Kurakin et al., 2016; Xiao et al., 2018; Carlini
and Wagner, 2017] have been proposed to find such exam-
ples. Generally, these methods can be divided into two types,
1) maximum-allowable attack and 2) regularization-based at-
tack. Typically, maximum-allowable attacks achieve faster
but larger perturbations than regularization-based attacks.
Both types of attacks retain a hyper-parameter called step size
or learning rate which controls the maximum-allowance of or
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Figure 1: Examples of adversarial examples generated by ensemble
VGG16 and Resnet50 [Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014; He et al.,
2016]. Left column: the original images. Middle column: the
adversarial noises, the gray color represent zero perturbation. Right
column: adversarial images generated by our method.
rate of convergence. Step size, in most cases, is a fixed num-
ber, while Decoupling Direction and Norm (DDN) [Rony et
al., 2018] method changes its step size by either as a weight
decay or weight increase depending on the label of the current
iteration.
Ensemble of models has been commonly used in compe-
titions and researches to enhance performance and improv-
ing the robustness [Hansen and Salamon, 1990; Krogh and
Vedelsby, 1995; Caruana et al., 2004]. So attacking en-
semble of models that use one set of input is also neces-
sary. Currently, studies and competition solutions in ad-
versarial attacks are often applied fuse in logits with fixed
weights as simple ensemble method [Dong et al., 2018;
Rony et al., 2018].
Inspired by DDN, we propose an efficient project gradi-
ent descent for ensemble adversarial attack which improves
search direction and step size of ensemble models. Our
method won the first place in IJCAI19 Targeted Adversar-
ial Attack competition. By using the same codes, we ranked
twenty-third in Non-Target Track.
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2 Related Work
We focus on the competition problem formulation and its cor-
responding metric criteria as well as some well-known at-
tacks.
2.1 Problem Formulation
Let x be an sample from the input space X ∈ Rd×d×3 where
d is the input width and height, with ground truth label ytrue
and random assigned attack target label ytarget from label set
Y ∈ N. Let fi : Rd×d×3 → RM be the i attack model with
M possbile labels and output logit values. Let D(xraw,xadv)
be the distance measurement that compare the similarity of
clear image xraw and adversarial image xadv . In this report,
we use the following distance measurement which is consis-
tent with competition criteria :
D(xraw,xadv|f) =

64 failure
1
d2
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
||xijraw − xijadv||2 success
(1)
For target attack, success means xadv fool the classifier to
the assigned label while for non-target attack, success just
represent that xadv fool the classifier away from its ground
truth label ytrue. One thing needs to be pointed out: this
distance measurement is not the same as the l2 or so-called
Frobenius norm of the xraw − xadv. In this case, it measures
the average distance of spatial points in 3 image RGB
channels. This specific design encourages us to generate
more spatial sparse adversarial examples.
Given a set of N evaluation models fi where i ∈ [1, N ],
the final score S is calculated as:
S =
1
nN
N∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
D(x(j)raw,x
(j)
adv|fi) (2)
Where n is the number of testing images. In the final stage, n
is equal to 550. For this task, the smaller score, the better the
performance.
2.2 Attacks
In this section, we review some adversarial examples gener-
ated by methods which are related to our methods.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) performs a single step
update on the original sample x along the direction of the gra-
dient of a loss functionL(x, y;θ) [Szegedy et al., 2013]. The
loss could be either an accuracy metric like cross-entropy or
a dispersion metric like standard deviation [Jia et al., 2019].
xadv = clip[0,1] {x+  · sign(∇xL(x, y;θ)} (3)
where epsilon controls the maximum l∞ perturbation of the
adversarial samples, and the clip[a,b](x) function forces x to
reside in the range of [a, b]. FGSM can be easily extended to
l2 norm criteria which fit the competition criteria better. In
the following section, we will focus on l2 norms to make this
report more related to the competition scenario.
xadv = clip[0,1]
{
x+  · ∇xL(x, y;θ)||∇xL(x, y;θ)||2
}
(4)
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) is an iterative version of
FGSM. In each iteration, PGD greedily solves the problem of
maximizing the loss function:
x
(t+1)
adv = clip[0,1]
{
x
(t)
adv +  ·
∇xL(x, y;θ)
||∇xL(x, y;θ)||2
}
x
(0)
adv = xraw (5)
Here, clip is a projection function and can be replaced by
other functions like tanh to force output of each iteration
within the effective range. To further use the second order
information, Momentum-based method or other optimiza-
tion methods like RMSprop and Adam can be applied to
speed up the iteration process and enhance the transferabil-
ity. Momentum-based PGD can be formal as below [Zheng
et al., 2018; Dong et al., 2018].
g(t+1) = µ · g(t) +  · ∇xL(x, y;θ)||∇xL(x, y;θ)||2
x
(t+1)
adv = clip[0,1]
{
g(t) +  · ∇xL(x, y;θ)||∇xL(x, y;θ)||2
}
(6)
g
(0)
adv = xraw
Where µ is a parameter to adjust the balance of the current
gradient and the historical gradient.
Decoupled Direction and Norm
For NeurIPS 18 adversarial attacks competition, [Rony et al.,
2018] propose a method which decouples direction and norm
for PGD. DDN, generally says, at each iteration, associates
its search direction and step size with its current predicted
label. This method performs better and can also speed up the
search process.
Ensemble Adversarial Attack
In NIPS 17 adversarial attack competition, [Dong et al.,
2018] reports that fuse in logits with cross-entropy and soft-
max achieve the best performance. Let fi(x) becomes the
logit output of is model. This ensemble method can be
formed as follow:
z(x) =
N∑
i=1
wifi(x)
σi(z) =
ezj∑K
j=1 e
zj
∀i ∈ Y (7)
L(x, y) =
N∑
i=1
I{i = y}σi
Algorithm 1 EPGD
Input: Input image x, target class y
Input: Model fi(x) and pi(x, y) for i ∈ [1, N ]
Input: Maskm
Input: Minimal step size ηmin, maximal step size ηmax, max-
imal iteration K, confidence level c
Output: adversarial example xadv
1: Initialize x˜0 = x, wi = 1N ∀i ∈ [1, N ]
2: for t← 1 to K do
3: z(x) =
∑N
i=1 wifi(x)
4: σi(z) =
ezj∑K
j=1 e
zj
∀i ∈ Y
5: L(x, y) =∑Ni=1 I{i = y}σi
6: g = ∇xL(x, y)
7: g ←m · g
8: p = clip[0,c]{
∑N
i=1 wipi(x, y)}
9: η = ηmax − (ηmax − ηmin)pc
10: x˜t = x˜t−1 − η g||g||
11: if x˜t is adversarial example for all models then
12: return x˜t
13: else
14: for i← 1 to N do
15: if x˜t is adversarial example for fi then
16: wi ← 0
17: else
18: wi ← 1
19: end if
20: wi ← wi∑N
j=1 wj
21: end for
22: end if
23: end for
24: return x˜t
where I is defined as:
I{i = y} def=
{
1 i = y
0 i 6= y (8)
Here wi is is model weight. However, in their work, it is a
fixed number and does not change during each iteration.
3 EPGD
In this section, first we post the Algorithm 1 EPGD, where
the Capital E represents Efficient and Ensemble. Then we
discuss and give some explanation of this modification.
3.1 Changes of Step Size
Changes of step size is not a new idea to both training deep
neural networks and adversarial attacks. DDN [Rony et al.,
2018] modify step size as a weight decay per iteration. Here
propose our step size modification method, instead of using
exponential decay, we perform a truncated linear min-max
VGG 16 Inception V3 Resnet 50
Figure 2: Examples of adversarial noises generated by single model
of VGG 16 Resnet 50 and Inception V3. Here, black points represent
that at least one channel value has been modified.
scale for step size, formally:
p = clip[0,c]{
N∑
i=1
wipi(x, y)}
η = ηmax − (ηmax − ηmin)p
c
(9)
where pi(x, y) represent of probability output of label y of
model fi and c the confidence factor (0.5 in this competition)
which truncates and probability of ensemble model. If p is
above 0.5 then η will be ηmin, otherwise it is linear propor-
tion to p in the range of [ηmin, ηmax]. Indeed,this method is
a greedy estimation of the best step size, and perform better
than DDN weight decay in this competition.
3.2 Changes of Model Ensemble Weights
Fig.2 shows the general pattern of the individual gradient of
input image x with respect to the loss function. In most
cases, there are some overlapped regions, which lead to cer-
tain transformability for black box attack. We observed that
for the fixed model ensemble weights, sometimes a single
model has difficulty reaching the decision boundary, which
we define as a point when fixed weights lead to the local
optima. Different from DDN, other second-order searching
methods like the momentum method, could speed up the pro-
cess. This approach, however, has difficulty reaching the
global optima. We address this issue by changing the model
ensemble weights. At each iteration, we greedily use the av-
erage gradient of all models which were not attacked success-
fully as the direction to go. Through testing of all the above
methods, we found that our method performs the best of all
ensemble models.
3.3 Choices of Masks
We define mask as m ∈ {0, 1}d×d×3, and modify the final
output as:
xadv ←m · xadv + (1−m) · xraw (10)
Using mask is a very natural idea to L2 at-
tacks, which has been used in both compe-
titions and researches [Karmon et al., 2018;
Brendel and Brendel, 2018]. In our competition crite-
ria, applying spatial masks is better than applying channel
masks. For target attack, instead of updating the whole
image space, we fixed the noise region as relatively small but
Algorithm 2 Final Implementation Algorithm
Input: clear image xraw, target class y, resnet50 model
fres,vgg16 model fvgg, Inception V3 model finc
Input: T number of parameters set Pi for EPGD, in princi-
ple, the smaller index, the smaller noise it will generate
Output: adversarial example xadv
1: x˜0 ← EPGD(x, finc)
2: for t← 1 to T do
3: x = EPGD(x˜0, fres, fvgg,Pi)
4: if x is adversarial example for both fres, fvgg then
5: return x
6: end if
7: end for
8: return x
Scenario Score
EPGD+Tensorflow+3 Models+All tricks 34.98
EPGD+Tensorflow+2 Models+All tricks 38.62
EPGD+Tensorflow+2 Models+No tricks 39.82
PGD+Tensorflow+2 Models+No tricks 41.00
PGD+Pytorch+2 Models+No tricks 41.64
Table 1: Major Millstone for the changes of method and framework
continuous area in order reduce overall l2 distance since it
is obvious that some features are much more important than
others. For non-target attack, disperse grid mask with size
7×7 and space with 7 pixels performs the best. One possible
reason is that most deep neural networks architectures are
started with 3× 3 or 7× 7 global pooling operation.
4 Implementation and Scores
In a competition, some tricks also help to increase the on-
line score and may have a significant influence on the final
rank. Algorithm 2 is our implementation algorithm which ad-
dresses some specific issues. Table 1 is our major milestone
for the changes in method and framework.Table 2 is out final
submission parameters. In this section, we summarize some
useful tricks in adversarial attack competition. For the final
submission, we use one proxy model Inception V3 which was
trained by ourselves and two office model which are publicly
available Resnet 50 and VGG 16 [Simonyan and Zisserman,
2014; He et al., 2016; Szegedy et al., 2016].
4.1 Float Point Mapping
Consider the evaluation process which requires us map from
Rd×d×3 to {N ∩ [0, 255]}d×d×3 as RGB format, the method
of mapping float number to integer also affects the attack suc-
cessful rate as well as the overall distance. We define floor
operation as:
bxc def= max{m ∈ Z|M ≤ x} (11)
Based on this definition, there are three different rounding
methods:
bxadvc (12)
bxadv + 0.5c (13)
b|xadv − xraw|csign(xadv − xraw) + xraw (14)
Here xadv ∈ {R ∩ [0, 255]} and xraw ∈ {N ∩ [0, 255]}.
Eq.12 and Eq.13 are the standard definition of floor and
round which no need to discuss much. Eq.14 is our imple-
ment of mapping float numbers to integers. The main idea is
to round the number as close as possible to raw input. Our
method performs the best compared to all three mapping op-
erations in this competition.
4.2 Resize Methods
Given the fact that the input size of evaluation models varies
while the distance measurement is based on 299 × 299.
So the best choice is to generate adversarial examples un-
der 299 × 299. We need a transformation function T :
R299×299×3 → Rd×d×3 where d is required input of the eval-
uation model. Typically resize transformations are bilinear
interpolating, neatest interpolating and so on. Since the offi-
cial examples use PIL.Image.BILINEAR as the interpolating
method, it becomes very natural to use bilinear interpolat-
ing and not surprised it performs best. However, for Tensor-
flow version no more than 1.13, tf.image.resize images does
not share the consistent behavior with PIL and will lead to
lowering the attack success rate when applying the early-stop
trick.1. This problem is issue for tensorflow 1.14 or tensor-
flow 2.0 given the new v2 image resize api2.
4.3 Parameters Selection
The ultimate aim for this competition is to generate adver-
sarial example as small as possible within a limited time
(550 images in 25 minutes). So using fixed parameters
like step size and mask size for each image is not usually
optimized: small step size and mask size but larger iteration
step will lead to depleting time while large step size and mask
size will cause large perturbation. Although the step size
modification could partially solve this issue, there should be
other tricks to balance it. For the real code implementation,
like Algorithm 2, we apply a step-like or filter-like strategy,
starting from small perturbation parameters and gradually
increase the limit of perturbation.
4.4 Adversarial Example Evaluation
Adversarial example evaluation is a critical step for efficient
computing and offline test. Based on the above analysis,
we should apply this step in a cautious manner, since image
transformation in different libraries is slightly different. To
evaluate exactly the same image for submission, at each
iteration for EPGD, we generate a round output x˜ and use
PIL.Image.BILINEAR to resize the image as the adversarial
example evaluation input.
1https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/issues/6720
2https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/releases
T Model ηmin ηmax ms K c
0 finc 50 100 50 50 0.5
1 fres, fvgg 1 100 30 40 0.5
2 fres, fvgg 1 300 0 40 0.5
3 fres, fvgg 1 600 0 40 0.5
Table 2: Parameter setting for final submission. Herems represents
the boarder size of maskm
4.5 Framework Selection
Tensorflow and Pytorch are the two most important deep
learning libraries. In the preliminary stage and half time of
the final stage, we use pytorch due to its usability. However,
the different behavior of batch-norm implementation between
Tensorflow and Pytorch causes us to use Tensorflow since we
all know that 2 of 3 given models are used as online evalua-
tion models and run under Tensorflow.
We also tested several versions of Tensorflow because we
know that the permanence and APIs might be altered for
different Tensorflow version. It seems that Tensorflow 1.14
could be the best choice for this competition since it has both
tf.slim module and resize v2 method. However, we found
that the speed is too slow compare to version 1.4. There is
another github issue discuss the permanence difference 3.
5 Conclusion
In this report, we propose an efficient modified PGD method
called EPGD for attacking ensemble models by automatically
changing ensemble weights and step size per iteration, per
input. At the same time, we present some useful implemen-
tation tools, which aim to search small noise adversarial ex-
amples efficiently. Experiments show that our solution can
generate smaller perturbation adversarial examples than PGD
method, while remaining efficient. With this method, we won
the first place in IJCAI19 Targeted Adversarial Attack com-
petition.
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